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NEW RULES OF THE GAME: THE POLITICIZATION OF
COMMUNITY COURTS IN MOZAMBIQUE
Molly Utter*
Abstract: After a fifteen-year civil war, the Mozambique government turned
to customary justice to address the conflicts that emerged during the war by creating
Community Courts. The goal of the Community Courts was to mimic their
successful grassroots predecessors, the Popular Courts, and to bring justice to the
people, by the people. Yet one year before the creation of the Community Courts,
the Mozambican government implemented the Law on the Organization of the
Judiciary, which limited formal jurisdiction to the district level and excluded
grassroot courts from the official judicial structure. Grassroot courts, most
significantly the Popular Courts, ceased to run and were disbanded. This article
discusses the question: if the Mozambican government excluded grassroot courts,
why did the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) government create
the Community Courts? This article argues that the new FRELIMO government
created the Community Courts as a tool of political control. This article then
explores several recommendations to avoid misuse of customary courts by courts
in post-conflict states. First, states should consider placing customary courts under
the judicial branch to prevent post-conflict governments from using community
courts as a tool of political control. Second, community courts must operate on a
continuum between partial-incorporation and non-incorporation into the formal
justice system, depending on the cases being adjudicated. Third, the role of
codification of customary laws should be reevaluated considering codification’s
effect on community culture. Despite the advantages of codification, it allows
central governments to take away a community’s culture and halt the progressive
and flexible nature of customary law. Lastly, international scholars must accept that
customary justice is necessary and compatible with state-building in post-conflict
societies.
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INTRODUCTION
After a bloody, violent civil war from 1977 to 1992 between the
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique) and RENAMO
(Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) parties, Mozambique’s government
granted amnesty to all involved, turning inward to Community Courts to
resolve disputes stemming from the war and to facilitate reconciliation.1 The
Community Courts were created as institutionalized tribunals for conflict
resolution; its judgments were in accordance with good sense and equity,
bearing in mind the social and cultural values existing in Mozambique, with
respect to the Mozambique Constitution.2 Under this framework, the
Community Courts dealt with conciliation, processing, judging, and
implementing cases arising from issues stemming from the community. These
issues typically were family relationships, cases of other natures whose claims
and value were not greater than three times the national minimum wage, and
offenses against property.3
1

PEZU C. MUKWAKWA, MOZAMBIQUE CONFLICT INSIGHT 10 (Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael ed., 2020),
https://media.africaportal.org/documents/MOZAMBIQUE-Conflict-Insights-vol-1-Conflict-Insight-andAnalysis-1.pdf.
2
João Carlos Trindade, Rule of law and judicial independence 19 (United Nations Univ. World Institute
for Dev. Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 134, 2020), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/
Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2020-134.pdf.
3
Id. at 20.
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Customary courts in Mozambique have enjoyed widespread acceptance
and use because of their ability to bring justice to the people, by the people.4
The Popular Courts—a type of customary court—enabled people to “resolve
all problems and difficulties which emerge in the life of the community, the
local area, the village or the neighborhood.” These courts were considered a
guarantee of unity for Mozambican people.5 Yet towards the end of the civil
war, the FRELIMO party considered Popular Courts to be revolutionary, due
to their socialist nature, and abolished them.6 In 1992, FRELIMO
reconstituted the Popular Courts as Community Courts, making them hybrid
institutions that functioned in the same way as Popular Courts.7 However,
these new Community Courts implemented by FRELIMO centralized power.8
The use of Community Courts to centralize power by the new
government is a pattern frequently seen in post-conflict states. This article will
address the broader question of why post-conflict governments create
customary courts. To better understand this pattern, this article will answer
the question: if FRELIMO felt threatened by the Popular Courts, why did
FRELIMO mimic the Popular Courts by creating the Community Courts after
the civil war, despite abolishing the Popular Courts several years earlier?
Customary courts are popular because they typically are a more
accessible, culturally relevant, and legitimate venue for resolving disputes.
There is also growing recognition that customary courts are more effective at
fostering post-conflict reconciliation than formal court systems or tribunals in
4

In this paper, I use the term “customary courts” and “community courts” to mean institutions designed
in accordance with customary law to settle disputes between members of a traditional community. Customary
law includes the laws, practices, and customs of indigenous people and local communities that are often not
written down and gradually change over time. This definition is different from the idea of “customary
international law,” which refers to the aspects of international law that are based on customs or practice
between States. The customary law I refer to is based on the life and custom of indigenous people and local
communities; it varies depending on how communities recognize principles and apply them to all aspects of
their lives. There can be multiple forms of customary law within one state, making it a non-heterogenous
concept. The Community Courts implemented by FRELIMO are a type of customary court, but not the only
customary court in Mozambique. I focus on the Community Courts because they offer a clear example of a
new central government using customary law and courts to consolidate power. See Ewa Wojkoskwa, Doing
Justice: How Informal Justice Systems Can Contribute, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, OSLO
GOVERNANCE CENTRE 1, 9 (2006), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/UNDP%20DoingJusticeEwaWojk
owska130307.pdf; see also Customary Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/warand-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law (last visited Sept. 6, 2021).
5
Aase Gundersen, Popular Justice in Mozambique: Between State Law and Folk Law, 1 SOC. & L. STUD.
257, 259 (1992), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/096466399200100209.
6
Id.
7
The definition of hybrid institutions used herein comes from Professor Boaventura de Sousa Santos.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos defines hybrid institutions as legal entities or phenomena that mix different, and
often contradictory, legal orders or cultures, giving rise to new forms of legal meaning and action. Boaventura
de Sousa Santos, The Heterogenous Sate and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique, 40 L. & SOC. REV. 39, 60
(2006), https://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/Heterogeneous_State_and_Legal_Pluralism.pdf.
8
Id.
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post-colonial and post-conflict settings.9 Customary courts often benefit
society in ways formal courts cannot. For example, customary courts are more
accessible to citizens, they reflect the traditions and attitudes of the local
community, and have both civil and criminal components.10 Unfortunately,
many customary courts in colonized countries became a legal experiment for
colonizing powers and were changed to match the colonist nations’
preconceptions of culture.11 The new customary courts established by colonist
rulers “crystallized unalterable customary law that would allow them little
room to adjust the law in order to control local courts and by extension
society.”12 Even where customary courts in post-colonial societies were
shaped by the colonizing power, they still tend to reflect the attitudes of the
local community.13
However, the general international community, scholars of peace, and
law-building institutions have failed to recognize the trends that accompany
the implementation of customary courts, for three reasons. First, many
customary courts have operated largely under the radar of international
monitoring groups.14 This has been possible in part because customary courts
are considered “informal” judicial systems, separate from the formal judicial
structure.15 Second, Mozambique has been hailed as a “successful” postconflict state by the United Nations (UN) because of its free elections,
exponential growth rates, and continued peace.16 This “successful” label has
shielded Mozambique from the typical involvement of international
monitoring groups. Third, because the Community Courts function as a hybrid
institution, not formally recognized by the Mozambique Constitution, the
central government can manipulate the norms of the Community Courts. For
9

Rekha Kumar, Customary Law and Human Rights in Botswana (Univ. of Denver Hum. Rts. & Hum.
Welfare Working Papers, Working Paper No. 52, 2009), https://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/
2009/52-kumar-2009.pdf.
10
Id.
11
Brendan Tobin notes that during the colonial period, one of the first colonial experiments with
codification was the customary code for Natal (a former province in South Africa). The codification mainly
concerned family law and succession. But some scholars believed that Natal’s codes were out of touch with
African practice and was injurious to custom. Likewise, in Fiji, the British colonists’ inability to understand
the country’s complex political relations resulted in individual land rights being designated as communal
title. This codification created new community power structure that was changed by the colonist and served
the colonial purpose of forming “near, simple, and governable groups and empowered leaders.” Brendan
Tobin, Why Customary Law Matters: The Role of Customary Law in the Protection of Indigenous Peoples’
Human Rights (Sept. 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, National University of Ireland Galway) (on file with author).
12
Id. at 67–68.
13
Id.
14
Leila Chirayath et al., Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality of Justice
Systems, WORLD DEV. 1, 3 (2005), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9075.
15
Id.
16
Jeremy Weinstein, Mozambique: A Fading U.N. Success Story, 13 J. OF DEMOCRACY 141, 141 (2002),
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/17188.
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example, the central government manipulated the Community Courts by
taking the customary law out of the hands of communities and giving control
over customary law to the central government. It is important to understand
the interplay between customary and formal courts in post-conflict states to
raise red flags when post-conflict states co-opt customary courts, as witnessed
in Mozambique.
This article contends that the FRELIMO government created the
Community Courts after its civil war to codify customary law and use the
courts as a tool of control. Section I explains (1) how the Community Courts
in Mozambique were created and shaped from the disbanded Popular Courts;
and (2) how the FRELIMO government has been able to change the rules of
the Community Courts to make them political tools. Section II introduces the
theories of transitional justice.17 Section III discusses how new governments
in post-conflict societies can use state control to manipulate and codify
community-based laws formed by tradition. Section IV provides general
recommendations for how post-conflict states can insulate customary courts
from overreaching central governments.18 These recommendations may vary,
as they depend on the unique and evolving situation in each post-conflict
setting. They are not meant to be prescriptive, but to push the conversation of
post-conflict rule of law forward. The article concludes by discussing the
consequences of politicized customary courts.

17

Transitional justice “is the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
reconciliation.” U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations
Approach to Transitional Justice (Mar. 2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_Mar
ch_2010FINAL.pdf
18
In post-conflict state building, decisions on decentralization versus centralization come as a strategic
choice, where decentralization is often put forward as a solution to governance challenges. One reason for
this is because a central state, the power and authority are concentrated in the hands of the central government
while regions and local authorities have little to no power. This means even though a country may have three
different branches of government (executive, legislative, and judiciary), the transfer of power between the
executive and/or legislative power is minimally delegated to subunits such as state, country, municipal.
Therefore, in this article when I talk about the central state, I am referring to the executive and legislative
branches of government. See Giulia Squadrin, Difference Between Centralization and Decentralization,
DIFFERENCEBETWEEN.NET, http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/politics/difference-betweencentralization-and-decentralization/ (Sept. 6, 2021).
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THE RISE OF COMMUNITY COURTS IN MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique has been deemed a “successful” post-conflict society by
the United Nations.19 The country has experienced consecutive free elections,
exponential economic growth rates, and continued peace, despite granting
amnesty to all parties involved in the civil war.20 Mozambique granted
universal amnesty based on the belief that both parties to the conflict
committed equally atrocious crimes against humanity and that both parties
used highly localized mechanisms of violence.21 Because civil war violence
was localized and because the State wanted to avoid the formal judicial
system, Mozambique focused inward and used customary courts to implement
measures of reconciliation that would best suit the communities.22 Due to its
heavy reliance on customary courts after the civil war, Mozambique appeared
to offer a positive example of a localized post-conflict reconciliation model.
Mozambique provides a useful case study for analyzing how customary courts
in post-conflict societies—even when deemed successful—can be used as a
tool of political control. To better understand the role of Community Courts
in Mozambique, it is important to fully understand both the civil war and the
Popular Courts, which led to the establishment of the Community Courts.
A.

The Civil War

The civil war can be understood in three separate time periods. The first
part took place from 1977 to 1980, when FRELIMO was placed on the front
line of attack from two neighbors, South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and
South Africa.23 South Rhodesia sponsored a small group of anti-government
protestors, called RENAMO, which was dominated by disgruntled Portuguese
individuals who fled Mozambique after the country’s independence.24
The second part of the conflict took place from 1981 to 1984. During
this period, RENAMO operations spread from central provinces into the
southern regions of Mozambique. Major transportation and communication
arteries were targeted and destroyed, and agricultural production was

19

Weinstein, supra note 16, at 142.
Id.
21
See generally NATALIA BUENO, MEMORIES AND RECONCILIATION: AMNESTY IN MOZAMBIQUE (2015).
22
Id.
23
World Peace Foundation, Mozambique: Civil War, MASS ATROCITY ENDINGS (Aug. 7, 2015),
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/mozambique-civil-war/.
24
The RENAMO forces fighting FRELIMO were a subdivision of the Rhodesian security force.
20
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disrupted by mines.25 A serious drought, rising oil prices, a world economic
recession, and a sudden hike in interest rates escalated the conflict.26 The first
attempts to negotiate peace took place in March 1984, when President Samora
Machel of Mozambique met with Prime Minister Pik Botha of South Africa.27
This negotiation failed when South Africa reengaged their support of
RENAMO.28
The third and final part of the conflict took place from 1984 to 1992
and was marked by negotiation attempts. However, these negotiations failed
because the mediators lacked impartiality and did not engage in thorough
consultations with either side.29 An atmosphere of mistrust permeated the
talks and statements were misinterpreted.30 In 1984, a ceasefire with South
Africa broke down.31 The civil war came to an end with the signing of the
Rome Peace Accord in 1992, which granted full amnesty to both RENAMO
and FRELIMO forces.32 The civil war resulted in one million deaths and five
million persons displaced—a devastating outcome, given that Mozambique’s
population totaled approximately fourteen million people at the time.33
B.

The Popular Courts

Throughout the conflict, the Popular Courts served as the primary
judicial system. These courts were in existence from 1978 to 1992.34 After the
civil war, Mozambique focused on building a new legal system that was
popular and democratic. This was because popular justice was an essential
component of Mozambican culture.35
25
See David Robinson, Curse on the Land: A History of Mozambican Civil War (2006) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Western Australia) (on file with author).
26
Id. at 329.
27
Id. at 171.
28
Martin Rupiya, Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique, AN INT’L REV. OF PEACE
INITIATIVES:
ACCORD
5,
55
(1998),
https://www.c-r.org/accord/mozambique/historicalcontext%C2%A0war-and-peace-mozambique.
29
Alan Cowell, Mozambique Truce Accord Reached, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 1984), https://www.nytimes.co
m/1984/10/04/world/mozambique-truce-accord-reached.html.
30
See generally Rupiya, supra note 28.
31
See Rupiya, supra note 28, at 13.
32
General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, KROC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE STUDIES,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-peace-agreement-for-mozambique (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
33
See Mozambique: Civil War, supra note 23.
34
João Carlos Trindade & João Pedroso, The Judicial System: Structure, Legal Education and Legal
Training, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE 113, 115
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos et al. ed., 2006), http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/6-trindade.pdf.
35
Popular justice was a popular component of restructuring the judicial system in Mozambique because
the legal system was based on the principle that laws and legal systems would be placed at the service of the
people through an administration that included the participation of the people themselves; Gundersen, supra
note 5, at 259.
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The Popular Courts were created through the Law on the Organization
of the Judiciary of Mozambique, Law No. 12/78 of 2 December 1978.36 They
were implemented at six levels: locality, community village, neighborhood,
district, province, and Supreme Court.37 The level of jurisdiction varied
between courts.38 At the district level, the courts could only deal with cases
pertaining to family matters and those with financial sums that did not exceed
50,000 metical, the Mozambican currency.39 At the provincial level, the courts
could handle civil and criminal matters that could not be heard at the locality,
neighborhood, or district level.40 At the Supreme Court level, the courts could
hear appeals from lower courts, standardize jurisprudence, settle disputes
between the lower courts and other authorities, and judge criminal
proceedings of those involved in high positions of the FRELIMO party.41
The role of judges in Popular Courts merits close consideration because
judges were used to ensure popular participation.42 At each level (except the
locality, community village, and neighborhood levels) judges were a
combination of professional judges appointed by the Ministry of Justice,
judges elected by the Popular Assemblies, and lay judges.43 The elected
judges were lay citizens who had the confidence of the citizens and the
FRELIMO party.44 Lay judges were community members with no formal
judicial training, whose function was to mediate and ensure “the people’s
sense of justice” was reflected in the courts.45 Each judge exercised authentic
jurisdictional functions and could intervene in decisions, in criminal cases.46
The Popular Courts contributed to the presence of a new independent
state institution by promoting the transition from the colonial state apparatus
to a legal system based on popular justice and democracy.47 The courts
allowed for “new” characteristics of Mozambique to be reflected in a new

36

Trindade & Pedroso, supra note 34, at 114.
Id. at 115.
38
Id. at 115.
39
Id. at 116; Constituição da República de Moçambique [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 30, 1990, art. 32 no. 1a
(Mozam.). Today, 50,000 metical equals $784.01 USD. However, I was unable to find the conversion from
1978. 50,000 MZN to USD to Metical to US Dollar Exchange Rate, MONEYEXCHANGERATE, https://money
exchangerate.org/currencyexchange/mzn/usd/50000 (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
40
LAW NO. 12/78, ART. 32, NO. 2, a and b.
41
Trindade & Pedroso, supra note 34, at 117.
42
Gundersen, supra note 5, at 259.
43
Trindade & Pedroso, supra note 34, at 116–117.
44
Id. at 115.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Gundersen, supra note 5, at 257.
37
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legal framework.48 Despite the Popular Courts’ success, FRELIMO claimed
that the Popular Courts were associated with the revolutionary process and
linked to socialism.49 FRELIMO wanted the democratic culture that they were
trying to establish to be the only legitimate cultural reference for
Mozambicans, which meant formally rejecting the socialist culture of
Mozambique.50 The ideological link to socialism allowed FRELIMO to
disband the Popular Courts and create new community-based courts, where
FRELIMO could influence the law itself and the ideology of the justice
system.51 This allowed FRELIMO to ensure all those involved with the
Community Courts had loyalty to FRELIMO.
C.

Community Courts in Mozambique

A year before the end of the Civil War, the FRELIMO government
abandoned the judicial system of Popular Courts in the 1990 Mozambican
Constitution. The FRELIMO government wanted to disassociate itself with a
socialist identity and to create a new and just society.52 After the civil war,
FRELIMO began a radical state-building and societal transformation, which
focused on creating a FRELIMO-dominated state apparatus.53 These efforts
impacted the justice system when the FRELIMO government abandoned the
Popular Courts, failed to regulate Law No. 4/92, which created the
Community Courts, and codified customary norms and processes to create the
Community Courts.
48
These new characteristics were based on an alternative form of administration of justice. In the case of
the Popular Courts justice was administered in an unofficial format which was dissociated from state power,
and the substantial and procedural rules are imprecise, flexible, ad hoc. Id. at 259.
49
Popular courts were “like a weapon permanently aimed at the class enemy, the reactionaries, the traitors,
saboteurs of the economy and unscrupulous exploiters, criminals and outlaws throughout the country.”
Therefore, the Popular Courts were considered a guarantee of consolidation and unity of the Mozambican
people to create a new law. This purpose was one reason the Popular Courts were linked to socialism. Another
reason the courts were linked to socialism is because they were created during the socialist period in
Mozambique. Therefore, when FRELIMO was trying to construct a new democracy in 1994, they wanted
the democratic culture to be the only legitimate cultural reference. This meant disassociating with socialist
thinking and institutions, such as the Popular courts. de Sousa Santos, supra note 7, at 49; Helene M. Kyed,
Legal Pluralism in Post-War Mozambique, 39 J. OF S. AFR. STUD. 989 (2013) (reviewing Boaventura de
Sousa Santos, The Heterogeneous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 39 (2006));
KAPICUA MAPUTO, THE DYNAMICS OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN MOZAMBIQUE (Helene M. Kyed et al. eds.,
2012); see also Stephen Lubkemann et al., Dilemmas of Articulation in Mozambique: Customary Justice in
Transition, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN WAR-TORN SOCIETIES 13 (Deborah Isser ed.,
2012)); Gundersen, supra note 5, at 259.
50
de Sousa Santos, supra note 7, at 49.
51
Id.
52
See Gundersen, supra note 5, at 263.
53
Bjorn Bertelsen, Multiple Sovereignties and Summary Justice in Mozambique A Critique of Some Legal
Anthropological Terms, 53 SOC. ANALYSIS 123, 125 (2009).
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To further its mission, FRELIMO created the Organic Law of the
Judicial Courts, which stated that this new judicial structure was “consistent
with the new philosophy of the organization of the state and many democratic
institutions in the country.”54 Yet community courts were not mentioned in
the Organic Law of the Judicial Courts. The 1992 Constitution provided the
legal framework for the Community Courts; however, the Community Courts
were not legally recognized until Law No. 4/92 was implemented. 55 Law No.
4/92 “indicated the need to value and deepen [community style justice], taking
into account the ethnic and cultural diversity of Mozambican society.”56
FRELIMO justified the creation of Community Courts by claiming they were
able to “resolve small differences within the community and contribute
towards harmonizing the various practices of justice and enriching rules,
habits, and customs, thus leading to a creative synthesis of Mozambican
laws.”57
Through the implementation of Law No. 4/92, FRELIMO was able to
codify community justice and cultural norms and processes. When customary
law is codified well and thoughtfully, cultural norms can still exist within the
law. However, the process of codification by FRELIMO froze cultural norms
in a particular point in time. This made customary law the property of
FRELIMO because the party determined which cultural norms would be used
in customary law.58
After creating the Community Courts, FRELIMO was able to politicize
the Community Courts in three main ways: through judges, the appeal
process, and through the choice of locations of the Community Courts. The
FRELIMO government never provided the regulations needed to implement
the law that created the Community Courts, Law No. 4/92.59 Because these
regulations were not promulgated to implement Law No. 4/92, the central

54
Conceição Gomes et al., Community Courts, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: THE
CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE 203, 203 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos et al. eds., 2006), https://dataspace.
princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp012z10wt03k.
55
Id. at 203.
56
Id.
57
PREAMBLE TO LAW NO. 4/92.
58
Id.
59
“Regulated” for purposes of this paper is akin to “enforced.” Law No. 4/92 was enacted in 1992 to allow
citizens to resolve minor disputes within the community, to contribute to the harmonization of different legal
practices, and to enrich the rules, habits, and customs that lead to a creative synthesis of Mozambican law.
However, Law No. 4/92 was never effectuated. It did not include all the details needed to explain how
individuals, businesses, state, or local governments might follow the law. It lacked the regulations needed for
successful implementation. The Mozambican government never created a regulation, leaving Law No. 4/92
to go unenforced.
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government was able to change the rules of the courts.60 For example, after
creating the Community Courts and codifying the laws of the Community
Courts, the FRELIMO government decided judicial vacancies would be filled
directly by individuals connected with the FRELIMO party.61 This allowed
FRELIMO to politicize the Community Courts and ensure the courts did not
create a legal framework that might delegitimize the government.
1.

Politicization of community courts through judges

Article 7 of Law No. 4/29 stipulates that Community Courts are to be
composed of eight judges, consisting of five full members and three
substitutes. In practice, however, the number of judges is not uniform across
courts; some courts have fewer judges. 62 Law No. 4/92 determined that the
judges of the local and neighborhood courts would continue to exercise their
function until the first election, the dates or frequency of which were not stated
in the law.63 In the absence of regulation, there were no elections. This meant
judges who previously served on the Popular Courts kept their positions on
the Community Courts.64 Some judges left their positions because they felt a
loss of social prestige attached to the position and felt abandoned by their
government.65 Judges who left or died during the civil war were not always
replaced.66
With no regulatory law to govern the process, replacement of judges
was governed by the socio-political environment.67 New judges were elected
through the local grupos dinamizadroes (dynamic groups), proposed by
neighborhood structures, or by direct intervention of individuals connected
with the FRELIMO party.68 With this structure, almost all the judges belonged
to the FRELIMO party.69 They participated in party organizations such as the
60

Today, Mozambique is ranked 112th across 128 countries in terms of regulatory enforcement based on
the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. Regulatory enforcement measures the extent to which
regulations are fairly and effectively implemented and enforced. Regulations, both legal and administrative,
structure behavior within and outside the government. When looking at the data from the World Justice
Project, the government of Mozambique has a pattern of not fairly and effectively implementing and
enforcing
regulations.
See
WJP
Rule
of
Law
Index,
WORLD JUST. PROJECT,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2020/Mozambique/Regulatory%20Enforcement/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
61
See Gomes et al., supra note 54, 54at 206.
62
Id.
63
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Organizaco da Mulher Mozambicana (Organization of Mozambican Women,
which is part of FRELIMO) and local grupos dinamizadores.70 Since new
judges had ties to the FRELIMO party, the Community Courts were
increasingly seen as instruments of FRELIMO. The perceived politicization
of the Community Courts undermined their legitimacy and often created
issues with the communities. In Mocimboa de Praia, supporters of RENAMO
created their own parallel community court.71 In Angoche, a municipality won
by RENAMO in 2003, the Community Courts struggled to attract litigants
because of their political affiliation.72 The result was a profound distrust of
the Community Courts’ ability to judge cases with the impartiality parties
required.73 With judges’ direct association with the FRELIMO party,
Community Courts became a tool for FRELIMO to centralize their political
control.
2.

A lacking appeal process

Moreover, Law No. 4/92 did not provide for an appeal process to appeal
cases from the Community Courts to the official courts.74 This further
delegitimized the courts and centralized FRELIMO’s power. Appeals serve
two important functions in the Mozambican court system. The first is to
correct errors by the initial decision maker.75 An appellate court often has
greater experience, fewer time pressures, a collegial decision-making process,
and the ability to correct mistakes of lower courts.76 Published appellate
decisions provide information about erroneous decisions and aid in clarifying
the law.77 Without an appeals process, the decisions of Community Court
judges were final. Over time, people simply stopped using the Community
Courts in locations dominated by RENAMO supporters due to the politicized
nature lack of the appeals process.78
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Politization through physical location

The physical location of the Community Courts made them vulnerable
to politicization because court proceedings were frequently disrupted by
weather and because FRELIMO leased and controlled many of the court
buildings.79 Court locations were not regulated by Law No. 4/92, so many of
the Community Courts operated on the same premises as the former Popular
Courts.80 And because the courts operated in open air, court activities were at
the mercy of the weather.81 Sessions were interrupted any time it rained,
effectively making the courts seasonal.82 The Community Courts that operated
indoors faced precarious conditions. The buildings were provided by the
grupo dinamizador, the FRELIMO party, the Administrative Post, the school
director of the Municipal Councils, and some even functioned in the homes
of the presiding judges.83 With Community Courts operating in buildings
loaned by the FRELIMO party, the courts often had to be shared by the local
grupo dinamizador.84 The shared space greatly affected the working hours of
the courts, and if the parties were not on time, trials were sometimes operated
by members of the grupo dinamizador.85 Without a stable location to operate,
document storage was impossible—judges often had to take their files home
with them.86
To better understand the process of politicizing community justice, it
helps to explore how the Community Courts were used as a form of
transitional injustice and how legal pluralism allowed FRELIMO to
disenfranchise the courts through the codification of customary law. Through
these theoretical understandings, it becomes clear how FRELIMO was able to
control the Community Courts and use them as a tool of political control to
centralize their power in Mozambique’s post-conflict state.
II.

THEORETICAL FRAMING

The implementation of Community Courts by the FRELIMO
government in Mozambique is an example of how a post-conflict government
can manipulate transitional justice systems into systems of injustice. This
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
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section discusses the meaning of transitional justice by examining how a postconflict state can co-opt transitional justice systems to consolidate power.87
Section A discusses the normative ideas of transitional justice, including the
use of customary courts as a form of dispute resolution. Section B then
exposes the normative ideas of transitional justice for their inaccuracies and
discusses “transitional injustice.”
A.

Judicial Systems and Transitional Justice

When post-conflict states do not have an effective justice system, there
cannot be an effective regime. 88 An effective judicial system allows for the
punishment of injustice and the creation of a strong rule of law.89These two
characteristics grant the government legitimacy. If the state can show through
the judicial branch that they are making strides towards building trust within
the fractured society, this highlights that the new regime depends on the fair
and impartial administration of law.90 Thus, individuals within society can see
that the state is taking the protection of human rights seriously through a
properly functioning legal system. This further shows external international
institutions that the state is making strides to become a democracy.91
Since the early 1990’s, judicial reform in post-conflict societies
centered around reestablishing the rule of law.92 The rule of law, as defined
by the UN, is “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and
entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms
and standards.”93 Interventions often used to bolster the rule of law includes
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training judges and other legal professionals, supporting the formation of
police forces, and establishing human rights commissions.94
When the rule of law approach is applied in post-conflict societies,
judicial institutions are supposed to become dispute resolution mechanisms
that apply rules mechanically and without discretion.95 There has been an
increased reliance on judicial institutions to address direct injustices against
individuals, including, human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.96 To fully address injustices against individuals, the “truth” about
past injustices and wrongdoings must be uncovered. This rationale has
expanded the definition of judicial reform to include non-formal judicial
institutions.97 Thus, judicial reform has now garnered the title “transitional
justice” in post-conflict societies.98 Transitional justice “is the full range of
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, to ensure accountability, serve
justice and achieve reconciliation.”99
The result is the creation of a multi-layered approach to judicial reform,
which can include international, national, hybrid, or local institutions.100 One
approach to address judicial reform through transitional justice is to focus on
local justice initiatives.101 The overall goal of local justice initiatives is to set
up customary courts that are able to handle cases, such as land disputes, estate
disputes, stock-theft cases, and petty criminal matters in an effective,
inexpensive manner.102 These local justice initiatives look different depending
on the state and the conflict.
The most common form of a local justice initiative is exemplified in the
Gacaca courts in Rwanda. After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the prisons
94
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were bursting with genocide suspects, and conventional courts were overrun
with cases.103 Two years after the genocide, the conventional courts had only
managed to try 1,292 genocide suspects, with 130,000 prisoners crammed into
a space meant for 12,000.104 At that rate, tens of thousands of suspects would
have been awaiting trial for years.105 To address this issue, the Rwandan
government proposed setting up community-based courts to try genociderelated crimes through the customary Gacaca model.106 The Gacaca courts
were run by local judges and encouraged community participation, making
ordinary citizens the main actors in dispensing justice and fostering
reconciliation.107 Customary courts can play an important role in filling the
gap of formal courts in post-conflict settings. By providing access to multiple
layers of courts, judicial reform has enabled fragile post-conflict societies to
rebuild the trust of the civilians and ensure justice for those who endured
horrific crimes against humanity.
The government of Mozambique made no effort to create courts like
the Gacaca in Rwanda. Mozambique proceeded with a “deny and forget”
approach, with wartime crimes given blanket amnesty, leaving no room for
truth and reconciliation.108 With the entire judicial system reimagined,
FRELIMO created Community Courts to allow local ethics and procedures to
address wartime disputes.109 Through a critical analysis of normative
assumptions regarding truth, peace, and democracy associated with the
implications of transitional justice, a new narrative emerges.110 The next
section discusses a new framework for analysis and the shifting of the
transitional justice narrative.
B.

Shedding New Light on Transitional Justice and Uncovering
Transitional Injustices

The central underlying normative assumption in transitional justice is
that the law is an impartial source of justice.111 But beyond normative
103
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assumptions of transitional justice, a new critical narrative of transitional
justice emerges. Even though transitional justice is implemented with “good
intentions,” governments often misuse mechanisms of transitional justice to
subvert the commonly prescribed normative goals previously identified.112
The same processes used to promote peace and democracy through the
transitioning regime can have very different outcomes than those reported in
mainstream media.113 In reality, these processes often perpetuate conflict by
process-specific violence, which includes the targeting of judges or witnesses
through death threats.114 Transitional justice processes have also perpetuated
violence when these justice processes target certain groups. For example,
violence resulted in Rwanda when the Gacaca courts only tried Hutu
nationals.115 The targeted groups may feel a need to resume violence to avoid
the sanctions placed on them.116
In addition, if the new regime has a weak rule of law and is not moving
towards democracy, the system of transitional justice can legitimize
authoritarianism.117 The term used to describe this critical approach to
transitional justice is “transitional injustice.”118 Transitional injustice shows
evidence of a state-centric and top-down mechanism used in post-conflict
societies because the law allows states to control institutions designed to
deliver justice.119 If the institutions that deliver justice are co-opted by politics,
then the rules of the game change. Rules may already exist on paper, but if
they are implemented by weak institutions, they may not be enforced due to
insufficient resources, capacity, or due to the lack of respect for the rule.120
Thus, institutions offer elites an arena to maximize political advantage
positions, further eroding trust.121 While there are numerous examples of
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transitional injustice, there are no clear examples of a transformative system
that avoids the manipulations used by new post-conflict governments.122
III.

POLITICAL CONTROL THROUGH COMMUNITY COURTS IN
MOZAMBIQUE

After the creation of the Community Court, the FRELIMO government
used these community-based adjudicatory bodies as a form of transitional
injustice and began manipulating the process of justice in the post-conflict
state. FRELIMO did this by creating a culture of denial and forgetting
(granting amnesty to all involved) and consolidating the autocratic state
(intentionally weakening the rule of law by placing judges in the Community
Courts who were FRELIMO party members or supporters). But how did the
FRELIMO government create a judicial system that gave them the power to
delegitimize the Community Courts? In Mozambique, this was done through
the “Superior State Approach,” which allowed the FRELIMO government to
remove customary traditions from communities and make community justice
practices the property of the state through codification of customary laws.
A.

How the Superior State Approach Allows a State to Politicize
Customary Courts

Civil wars or mass conflicts are rarely resolved with clear distinctions
between the winner and loser.123 Despite this unclear distinction, the
international community forces newly failed states to transition to
democracy.124 As such, one group (whether this is a dominant political party,
religious, or ethnic group) is placed in power over another. Many times, this
is done through the influence or selection of these “winner” or “loser” by the
international community. Once a new party gains power, it is typically, and
also paradoxically, rendered weak because this new government will have
lower levels of capacity and legitimacy than is needed to secure buy-in by
122
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those skeptical of the state.125 Therefore, creating an unstable environment
where the power of the state is contested.
Moreover, post-conflict states are pressured by the international
community to administer justice and adhere to the rule of law.126 After a
conflict, establishing a viable justice system is vital to the success or failure
of state-building.127 A state’s inability to function justly and effectively can
generate conflicts that spill across borders, facilitating criminal networks and
transitional violent extremism.128 However, new governments do not have the
capacity to administer justice justly and effectively. To ensure justice is
administered, new states often seek to establish rule of law in plural legal
systems.129
Legal pluralist systems develop in many post-colonial states. These
systems typically develop when newly independent states attempt to balance
the preservation of their cultural heritage through customary law with that of
modern constitutional regimes.130 Legal pluralism, defined as “two or more
legal systems coexist[ing] in the same social field,” allows a new state to
develop formal judicial systems and use customary forms of justice. 131 There
are two forms of legal pluralism. The first one is state law pluralism, where
the state incorporates part of non-state law, such as customary law, into its
legal hierarchy.132 The second one is deep legal pluralism, where there is no
hierarchy of legal systems, meaning state law and non-state law exist without
any formal relationship.133 New governments adopt one of these two types of
legal pluralism after a colonial power departs or a conflict ends because
customary courts are the dominant form of legal order. In Mozambique, the
use of state pluralism allowed FRELIMO to justify the codification of
customary law. In turn, this bolstered FRELIMO’s power because FRELIMO
was able to dictate how Community Courts would operate but disguise them
as customary courts.
The rules that comprise customary courts stem from custom, tradition,
religion, and family lineage, which have equal or greater influence in
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communities recovering from conflict than state law.134 It is estimated that
80% to 90% of disputes in developing economies are handled outside the state
justice system.135 One reason for this is that, in many post-conflict states, the
formal courts are corrupt, overwhelmed, or merely inadequate, in addition to
being too far geographically removed to be accessible or meaningful.136 For
these reasons, customary courts may sometimes be the only or better
alternative.
The new pluralistic legal system allows parties to select dispute
resolution forums based on accessibility, efficiency, cost, and perceived
legitimacy.137 But allowing multiple justice systems to coexist also creates a
challenge to the state’s claim on a legitimate resolution of legal disputes and
the uniform application of the law. This leads to a sustained struggle between
the state and customary actors for legitimacy, resources, and authority.138
Despite state’s needing customary systems to gain legitimacy, states have the
ability to co-opt the power dynamic and undermine customary courts., as
explained in the following paragraphs.
One way a state can remove power from customary courts is through
the “Superior State Approach.”139 As noted above, when a new government is
appointed the ruling party of a post-conflict state, they assume the role of
ultimate authority.140 Even though a state implements a system of legal
pluralism to gain legitimacy, the state is ultimately in charge of rewriting the
constitution. This rewriting allows the state to distribute power. To ensure a
state has a unified national identity and can effectively address atrocities, it
often recognizes the validity of customary law.141 By framing customary
courts as part of the judicial structure, but with limited powers, the state asserts
134
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that it is the proper guardian of local culture.142 With customary courts in the
hands of the state, the state can begin to codify customary law into State law
and assert the primacy of statutory courts over that of customary
adjudication.143
When states codify customary law in new regimes, they are often faced
with multiple versions of customary law practiced throughout a country.144
For example, there are at least sixty customary law systems, and
corresponding conflicting value sets, in the region of South Sudan.145 States
often face backlash from indigenous communities when attempting to codify
customary law. This is because codified customs are difficult to change and
may be used as tools of the state to restrict the application of previously used
oral laws.146 Despite this backlash, states move forward with codifying
customary law by identifying common underlying traits or recognizing one
preferred rule over another.147 The result is a system of customary law that
undermines its traditional application or results, in the boycott or ignorance of
the code by the local populace. Thus, customary law “ceases to be a living law
that adapts to suit the community it serves.”148
By taking custom out of the hands of communities and placing it into
the hands of the state, customary law becomes the state’s property.149 Without
codification, law is often internalized by the community; unwritten laws enjoy
public acceptance of both legal rules and institutions. 150 Unwritten laws also
allow for flexibility in their application because as norms change, so do the
laws.151 Yet when these rules and customs are codified, communities cease to
be the owners and guardians of customary law.152 When the state intervenes
in the customary process, it controls the custom and takes it away from
communities.153 At that point, customary law is no longer a reflection of
community norms and values, but a law defined and imposed by an external
authority, ensuring the superiority of state institutions over customary ones.
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As part of the Rome General Peace Accord, FRELIMO wrote the 1990
Mozambican Constitution.154 The Constitution created a multiparty system
and recognized the independence of judicial courts from executive and party
control.155 The courts gained their structure from the 1992 Organic Law of the
Judicial Courts. The law established three levels of judicial courts—district,
provincial, and a Supreme Court.156 Despite these three levels of judicial
courts, the Open Society Initiative reported that, “for Mozambicans, the
judicial courts are inaccessible, blocked by a range of obstacles including
financial constraints and their physical location. As a result, many citizens
continue to rely on alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, including
community courts.”157 As discussed above, the issue in Mozambique was that
FRELIMO disbanded the previous customary courts, called Popular Courts.
But with most Mozambicans relying on customary justice to address their
conflicts, FRELIMO was forced to rely on legal pluralism to maintain
power.158
The evolution of legal pluralism in Mozambique was not linear. The
new government went from relying on a system of no legal pluralism—by
disbanding the Popular Courts—to a state law pluralism structure. FRELIMO
incorporated customary law by creating the Community Courts, which took
on the legacy of Popular Courts by drawing on socio-cultural norms of local
communities that emphasized justice for the people, by the people.159
However, the Community Courts’ laws were codified by the state, meaning
FRELIMO was able to control the type of justice (such as decisions due to
judge selection) within communities. In addition, there was no appeals
process to the official courts from the decisions of the Community Courts.160
The law that created the Community Courts (Law No. 4/92) established how
courts could operate and a new law would define their jurisdiction and
institutionalization. However the new law did of the Community Courts did
not pass until 2005. This meant that until 2005, if a party wanted their case
reviewed, they had to bring the existing case to the state courts. Otherwise,
the decision rendered by the Community Courts was final.161
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Thus, in Mozambique, legal pluralism was used as a political tool to
consolidate power and influence. By centralizing influence over both the
judicial courts and Community Courts, FRELIMO was able to stay in
power.162
B.

Using Community Courts as Legal Hybrid Institutions

Customary courts fall within the broader “Western” definition of
informal justice systems, which are dispute resolution mechanisms that fall
outside the scope of formal justice systems.163 Customary courts are
widespread in developing economies. 164 They are the dominant form of
dispute resolution, “covering up to 90% of the population in parts of
Africa.”165 Characteristics of customary courts include problems and disputes
viewed as relating to the whole community, a high degree of public
participation, an emphasis on reconciliation and restoring social harmony, a
voluntary process, and a flexible procedure.166 Despite the vast reach and
importance of these courts, they are frequently disconnected from the formal
judicial systems.167 Several factors contribute to this disconnect, such as a lack
of funding, lack of communication between judges in the formal and informal
courts, and no common system of appeals between the customary and formal
courts.
Even though customary courts can be de-linked from the formal judicial
system and receive no monetary contributions from the government, they are
often still tied to the central government.168 It is often a strategic political
decision to delink customary courts from the formal judicial system because
it allows the central government to avoid regulating newly implemented
customary courts. The government can implement unregulated customary
courts as a form of reconciliation after mass atrocities. Governments can also
use aspects of the courts as a form of monitoring. A central government can
monitor customary courts by deciding the courts’ jurisdiction, how judges are
elected, whether there are appeal processes, and the locations of the courts.
162
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With the central government redefining customary courts power, the central
government can create a new legal scope for the customary courts.169 This
new legal scope allows customary courts to become legal hybrid institutions
that governments can use to maintain power.170
Mozambican Community Courts became a legal hybrid institution with
the creation of the Mozambican Constitution of 1990. The Constitution
abandoned the “Popular Justice” system and created a new framework. The
Constitution also allowed courts to be sovereign bodies, empowering them to
reinforce the legal order and the legal interests of the different governing
bodies and entities.171 The judicial system was no longer accountable to the
Popular Assembly and could create its own statutes. The judicial system
began to define its power structure through the Law on the Organization of
the Judiciary (referred to as Organic Law of the Judicial Courts), which made
changes to the judicial system. The first change was that new judicial
organizations were to limit formal jurisdiction to the district level (the first
level of judicial courts).172 Through this law, the grassroot courts created
under previous judicial organizations, such as the Popular Courts, were
excluded from the official judicial structure.173 At the same time, the judiciary
passed Law No. 4/92, creating the Community Courts.174 The Community
Courts were created as “bodies which enable citizens to resolve small
differences within the community and contribute towards harmonizing the
various practices of justice and enriching rules, habits, and customs, leading
to a creative synthesis of Mozambican law.”175 As a type of community
justice, the Community Court were to “bear in mind the ethnic and cultural
diversity of Mozambican society.”176 Judges were expected to decide cases
“with impartiality, good sense, and equity.”177 The Community Courts were
assigned to the Ministry of Justice, which was responsible for legal reform,
prison services, and registry and notary public services.178 Having the
Ministry of Justice oversee the Community Courts excluded the courts from
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the official justice bodies, which were under the direction of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.
Therefore, by delinking the Community Courts in Mozambique from
the formal judicial system, FRELIMO was able to determine the structure of
the courts in their favor. FRELIMO created a new court under the guise of
incorporating “tradition” and “culture” into the justice system, even if this was
not the true motivation.179 For example, Law No. 4/92 did not clarify how
judges would be appointed. With uncertainty surrounding the appointment
process, FRELIMO changed the rules: judges were to be selected from
FRELIMO organizations, there was not an appeals process, and courts were
to be placed in buildings with FRELIMO party members. These attempts to
incorporate customary norms by codification allowed FRELIMO to reaffirm
its monopoly over legal norms, taming customary law by co-opting it.
Community Courts became a weapon that FRELIMO could use to protect
their wider interests.180
IV.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM MOZAMBIQUE: INSULATING
CUSTOMARY COURTS FROM POLITICAL CAPTURE IN POSTCONFLICT STATES

Mozambique presents an all too familiar pattern—a new government in
a post-conflict state creates a new judicial system that includes both formal
and informal courts under the guise of gaining legitimacy in a fragile
environment. But this new judicial system is merely a tool used to consolidate
power. This is potentially devastating because customary law and courts are a
critical aspect of many states. For millions of local communities and
indigenous people, customary law is their primary source of law and
customary legal institutions are their only viable, trusted option for dispute
resolution.181 Customary law offers internal regulations to communities and
defines the rights of those within communities, making customary law integral
in countries with weak central governments.182 Customary law is also flexible
and can adapt to the community it serves, making it a living law that gradually
changes over time.183
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Because customary courts and laws are frequently abused, guarding
customary courts from co-option as political tools needs to be at the forefront
of the rule of law reform. Addressing this issue can provide valuable insights
for countries facing a similar situation and help those countries in preserving
the independence and legitimacy of their customary courts.
In this section, I argue that to protect customary courts, there must be
an understanding about which part of the government oversees customary
courts, the process of codifying customary law, how codification can be
accomplished while protecting the ability for community norms to develop
and evolve, and how the international community should approach rule of law
reform. However, it is important to note that each post-conflict state will be
faced with different circumstances that will impact how customary courts
should be insulated from the central government. The recommendations
below might not be applicable for all post-conflict states. The goal of these
recommendations is to push the conversation of insulating customary courts
forward.
A.

Placing Customary Courts Under the Judicial Branch

To ensure that customary courts are insulated from the central
government, they should be placed under the judiciary branch. When
customary courts are placed under the legislative or executive branch, courts
become politized. In Mozambique, the central government placed the
Community Courts under the legislative branch, which resulted in the political
manipulation of customary law used by the Community Courts. Placing
customary courts in the judiciary branch ensures their insulation from an
overreaching central government, assuming that the judiciary enjoys some
degree of independence.184
The Popular Courts in Mozambique, which preceded the post-conflict
Community Courts, provide an example of a court placed under the judicial
branch. The Popular Courts were successful in part because they were under
the judicial branch and there was clear separation of the judicial system from
the legislative branch. Popular Courts were created at all levels of
Mozambique’s administrative divisions, with professional lay judges; each
level of the Popular Courts had clear instructions on the types of cases they
could hear and punishments they could hand out.185
184
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With respect to jurisdiction, the Popular Courts had a clear description
of the criminal and civil cases they could hear at each level. For example, the
local level Popular Courts could hear criminal matters dealing with only minor
infractions liable to lead to sanctions such as public warning, community
service for up to thirty days, and fines not exceeding 1,000 metical.186 In civil
matters, the Popular Courts could only deal with cases involving amounts not
exceeding 10,000 metical.187 On the other hand, district level Popular Courts
dealt with any criminal case that could lead to a prison sentence of up to two
years, and with infractions committed by judges from the locality, community
village, or neighborhood popular courts.188 For civil matters, the district level
Popular Courts could deal with cases pertaining to family matters and all other
cases in which the dispute at issue did not exceed 50,000 metical.189
Judges became the most important part of the Popular Courts. The
Popular Courts employed professional judges trained by the formal judicial
system who could bring formal law principles into the communities.190 Mixed
in with the professional judges were lay judges who would ensure that the
people’s sense of justice was reflected in the court’s practice.
Based on lessons learned from the Popular Courts, if customary courts
are to be under the judicial branch, there are several prerequisites:
• Independence of the judicial branch
• Customary courts are available at all levels throughout the country
• Partnership between professional and lay judges, with lay judges
carrying the trust and respect of community members
• Each court has clear jurisdiction over defined classes of cases and
punishments that match the purpose of the courts.
Even when situated under the judicial branch, the Popular Courts ended up
being a vehicle for the imposition of state power because the judiciary wasn’t
independent from the central government. Unfortunately, the downfall of the
Popular Courts is an all too familiar story for customary courts in centralized,
authoritative states. If a State has a strong, authoritarian leaning central
government, the judicial branch will tend to be less independent because there
is little division between branches of government and the central government
can dictate which judges serve on the judiciary. With a less independent
186
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judiciary, central governments are able to politicize the courts by appointing
judges who have no judicial training, accept bribes that impact or determine
outcomes, and determine the rules for how a court will function.
While many believe the judicial branch is the best place for customary
courts to be situated, every post-conflict country is different; customary courts
should be placed within the judicial branch only if the judicial branch shows
signs of independence. To further insulate customary courts from an
overreaching central government, one must consider the level of incorporation
and ensure constitutional provisions recognize customary law and courts.
1.

Appropriate level of incorporation

Once customary courts are placed under the judiciary branch, the next
challenge is deciding the extent to which customary courts are incorporated
within the formal court system.191 There are three types of incorporation: full
incorporation, non-incorporation, and partial incorporation.
Full incorporation is when the state fully integrates customary justice
with a dedicated and defines the role vis à vis a formal system.192 Full
incorporation is rarely the appropriate option for customary courts because it
gives full power to the central government to define the laws that the
customary courts will implement.
Non-incorporation is when a state grants full reign to local communities
to apply and follow their local values, norms, and customs.193 Informal and
formal courts coexist but operate independently with strict jurisdictional
boundaries between them.
Partial incorporation is when a state blends the advantages and
disadvantages of both formal and informal justice.194 Formal and informal
justice systems operate relatively independently, but informal justice receives
recognition, resources, and oversight from the state.195
The recent trend in post-conflict states has been to use a system of nonincorporation. One of the advantages of non-incorporation is that it builds on
pre-existing structures. To build on pre-existing structures, the constitution
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and laws must recognize the existence of customary law.196 Additionally,
formal courts must consider the outcomes of customary courts in their
deliberation. Another advantage of non-incorporation is that it allows for
regional autonomy, which can enhance recognition of local customary forms
of governance.197 But non-incorporation has downsides, too. For instance,
non-incorporation can result in customary courts being exploited by elders,
men, and elitists. Women’s rights can be compromised when customary
courts are fully independent.198 Women’s rights can be compromised in
customary courts when the courts are be located in patriarchal societies or
women’s rights are not considered human rights in a State.199 Incorporation
underscores that in order for legal pluralism to be successful, reform must
integrate formal and customary justice and the importance of building on preexisting legal systems.
Intuitively, when deciding which level of incorporation to adopt, partial
incorporation seems like the structure that would allow customary courts to
flourish. However, under this structure, customary systems face challenges
with state overreach, formalizing the informal, and limitations on scale and
resources. Yet non-incorporation can diminish the rights of women. The
optimal approach is highly contextual and may vary from community to
community within a country. Therefore, the best approach for a post-conflict
state may be to allow customary courts to operate on a continuum between
partial and non-incorporation, depending on the cases being adjudicated.
2.

How customary law should be addressed in a
constitution

Even if customary courts can insulate themselves through
incorporation, the constitution of a post-conflict state must still reflect the
power of customary courts. Constitutions allow post-conflict states to assert
their sovereignty, even if the state is a legal pluralistic one.200 Even when
States allow for legal pluralism in their constitutions, customary courts can be
196
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forced to negotiate and reconcile the culture and norms that are the
foundations of customary law and courts.201
To insulate customary courts from a central state government,
constitutional provisions must explicitly grant and recognize customary law
and traditional institutions. Recognition can include, but is not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Including a definition of customary law
Establishing procedures for proof of customary law
Recognizing customary law as forming part of national law
Recognizing traditional authorities and traditional practices for their
establishment guaranteeing, promoting, and/or recognizing rights to
culture and/or cultural integrity
Establishing requirements regarding application of customary law by
courts
Establishing or maintaining traditional or local courts
Requiring customary courts to include judges versed in customary law
Creating advisory bodies or councils formed by traditional authorities
to participate in decision-making directly and provide for expert
advising on national law and its effect on customary law
Defining the relationship between customary law and common,
constitutional law, and/or national law
Setting forth procedures to ensure, to the extent possible, that
customary laws do not conflict with human rights as set forth in
national (and international) law.202

The first step to ensuring that customary courts are insulated from the
heavy hand of central governments is to engage in partial or nonincorporation, place customary courts under the judicial branch, and confirm
that constitutions have a clear recognition of customary courts and laws.
B.

What Does Codification Mean?

The situation in Mozambique demonstrates that codification of
customary law gives power to the state. Codification is an extremely
controversial course of action yet has been practiced for thousands of years.
Codification is the formulation and reduction of customary law to a written
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version of rules of law that establish doctrines and precedents.203 In
comparison, customary law is typically an unwritten source of law.
Customary law tends to be oral law, allowing the law to respond to shifts in
priorities and experiences within a community.204 Further complicating
codification is the fact there is not an agreed upon universal process of
codification, leaving each state in charge of determining how to codify. To
add to the complexity of codification, each community has its own customary
law. This can result in codification of the laws of a dominate tribe or ethnic
group that may be inconsistent with that of other tribes or groups, effectively
devaluing other forms of customary law.205 For example, in Tanzania, the
customary laws that were codified were largely based upon the practices of
the Bantu tribes, which conflicted with other groups’ customary laws.206
In the colonial period, there was an “obsession with rules and a
continued failure to understand customary law.”207 During decolonization,
newly independent states inherited a diverse body of customary law composed
of official codified custom, court custom, and living custom. This resulted in
a desire to respect customary law but also to do away with distinctions and
secure one law for all. To create one governing law required some form of
codification of the legal system.208
There are advantages to codification, such as transparency, consistency,
and regulation of research resource collection of customary law to ensure
human rights are incorporated into customary laws.209 However, the
advantages do not outweigh the problems. Below is a list of the issues that
codification of customary laws entails:
• Locks in one interpretation of local norms. The issue with this is there
are always varied customary legal regimes, and harmonization
undermines customary laws traditional approach.
• Culture and custom become the property of the state. Codification
occurs within the legislature, which means only the legislature can be
fully empowered to amend it. Thus, communities that produce the law
are deprived of their role in shaping the law. Without change by
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communities, customary law ceases to be a living law that adapts to suit
the community it serves.210
• Without change, customary law becomes a tool of the state to restrict
the application of the living law of the people. Without the growth of
custom, customary rights stop.211
• Courts may not arrive at the same interpretation of the customary rights
once they are codified if they follow strict construction or functional
interpretation.212
• Codification legitimizes the illegitimate and entrenching saying of
“poor justice for the poor.”213
C.

Rethinking the Role of International Monitoring

Lastly, the example of Mozambique suggests that the international
community and scholars of peace and law-building institutions should
reevaluate the role and implementation of customary courts in post-conflict
states. When the UN hailed Mozambique as a “successful” post-conflict state,
the central government was shielded from involvement by international
monitoring groups. Reevaluating the framework in which the international
community engages with post-conflict societies includes encouraging reform
that protects customary institutions from political capture. Rethinking justice
may include:
• Recognizing that justice reform is not just a technical exercise; it is
surrounded by complex cultures, socio-economic realities, and is
inherently political.214
• Focusing on sharing information, equipment, training between
customary courts.215

210

Id. at 71.
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
See Deborah Isser, Re-thinking Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Fragile
Countries, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN POST-CONFLICT AND FRAGILE SOCIETIES
CONFERENCE PACKET 13 (2009).
215
See Helen Maria Kyed, On the Politics of Legal Pluralism: The Case of Post-War Mozambique, in
CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN POST-CONFLICT AND FRAGILE SOCIETIES CONFERENCE
PACKET 155 (2009).
211

182

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 1

• Having a multi-layered strategy that offers support to state and nonstate
systems, acknowledging that plural legal systems are inevitable in
many post-colonial, post-conflict settings.216
• Viewing customary justice as viable homegrown alternatives to
standard western templates.217 This can be done in four ways:
(1) Place customary courts under the administration of the judicial
branch if the judiciary enjoys adequate independence.
(2) Constitutions should clearly recognize customary courts and
laws.
(3) Reconsider the codification of customary law, which can allow
allows a central government to use customary law as a political
tool of control; and
(4) Have the international community rethink justice reform to
ensure it is not just a technical exercise but is a multi-layered
strategy that does not see customary justice as an obstacle, but
instead as an opportunity for homegrown alternatives that can
allow a post-conflict state to have a chance at a successful
transition to non-conflict.
CONCLUSION
In the beginning of this article, I asked why FRELIMO created
Community Courts after the Mozambique civil war, despite abandoning
previous forms of customary justice in the 1990 Constitution. Throughout this
paper, I argued that the FRELIMO government implemented Community
Courts after the civil war as a tool of political control. The FRELIMO
government created Community Courts through Law No. 4/92, accomplishing
two objectives. First, by creating the Community Courts, the government used
state law pluralism to incorporate customary law used by the Popular Courts
into its legal hierarchy. Second, through the state law pluralism, the
FRELIMO government was able to codify customary law, meaning that the
legislative branch was able to determine and change the laws of the
Community Court, making laws a political tool for the FRELIMO
government.
To limit customary courts’ power, the new government can codify the
customary law on which customary courts depend on. Codification of
customary law allows a state to assert primacy over customary adjudication.
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In essence, through codification, a government can take customs out of the
hands of communities and place them into the hands of the state. By having
control over Community Courts, the FRELIMO government was able to
determine the role of judges, judges’ scope, how judges are elected to the
courts, and the location of courts. These actions allowed the FRELIMO
government to politicize the Community Courts and use them as a form of
control over opposition members in rural areas that threatened the stability of
the new FRELIMO government.
The system of legal pluralism in Mozambique enabled the FRELIMO
government to change the rules of the Community Courts to use laws as a
political tool. The politicization of Community Courts changed Community
Courts from being justice for the people, by the people, to justice determined
by the dominate political party in Mozambique. With Community Courts
being a FRELIMO backed judicial system, those in support of RENAMO lost
trust in Community Courts and stopped using them. Without access to justice
via the Community Courts, a many in Mozambique were left with no avenue
for redress. By creating a system in which courts were politized, the
FRELIMO government created a post-conflict state rife with underlying
conflict. Between 2002 and 2016, Mozambique faced political unrest, which
stalled peace negotiations and intensified small scale conflict. These examples
of intensified conflict highlight the importance for post-conflict societies to
create customary courts independent of the new central government.
First, to ensure independence of customary courts, states should
consider placing customary courts under the judicial branch. To do this, the
degree of independence of the judicial branch needs to be carefully evaluated.
If the judicial branch is independent from the executive and legislative branch,
then the customary courts should be placed under the judicial branch. Second,
the level of incorporation between the customary court and formal judicial
system, and recognition of customary law in the constitutional recognition
will further ensure customary courts are insulated from a central government
trying to politicize and manipulate customary courts. The optimal approach
for level of incorporation into the formal judicial system is highly contextual
and may vary between communities within a country. The best approach for
a post-conflict state may therefore be to allow customary courts to operate on
a continuum between partial and non-incorporation, depending on the cases
being adjudicated. Third, the role of codification needs to be reevaluated.
Despite the advantages of codification, it permits central governments to take
culture out of the hands of communities and halt the progressive nature of
customary law. Lastly, international scholars must accept that customary
justice is important, view customary justice as compatible with the mission of
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state-building in post-conflict societies, and incorporate these core principles
into new ideas of justice reform.

